

## Social Class and American Travel to Europe in the Late Nineteenth Century, with Special Attention to Great Britain

### Abstract

*In the latter half of the nineteenth century, first thousands, then tens of thousands of Americans traveled to Europe annually. Their designation in official statistics as “ocean-bound tourists” reflects that general view, both at the time and currently. At issue is only whether travel to Europe became sufficiently general to justify the label “mass” or “middle-class” tourism. In this article I show that American travelers to Europe, in fact, bore the stamp of the inequality that characterized their society. In steerage, mainly naturalized American citizens, precariously employed in the United States, crossed to Europe in numbers that fluctuated widely in response to changing conditions in the labor market. They were largely invisible among other emigrants responding to the same economic pressures. In contrast, cabin class witnessed a steadily growing and well-publicized summer exodus as the “habit” of European travel became general among wealthy Americans. Transatlantic tourism remained largely out of reach for the middle class. The article draws on official statistics on passenger volumes, original passenger lists, and contemporary press accounts to investigate the characteristics of travelers in cabin and steerage. The affordability of European travel is assessed using contemporary estimates of travel costs and income distribution.*

### Introduction

This article looks at American travel to Europe in the period from the end of the Civil War to the middle years of the Gilded Age. In 1864, the last full year of the war, 26,600 Americans went overseas; by 1875, the total had risen to 51,100; and by 1885, to 100,200.<sup>1</sup> Most went to Europe. The consensus view at the time and now is that most of these travelers were tourists. Steinbrink writes:

That large numbers of great Western Barbarians could and would swoop down upon the Old World in the later nineteenth century developed from the interplay of three basic causes: the burgeoning fortunes of northern businessmen during the Gilded Age; the vast improvement in transatlantic transportation; and, most significantly, the emergence of a large and thriving middle class.<sup>2</sup>

*Journal of Social History* vol. 51 no. 2 (Winter 2017), pp. 313–340

doi:10.1093/jsh/shw101

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I present contrary evidence that the actual class composition of American travelers in the Gilded Age was highly polarized. Between 1875 and 1885, over a quarter of all Americans travelers crossed each year in steerage, on average. In some years the figure was almost 50 percent. Cabin class remained the preserve of the wealthy and of business travelers. There is little evidence of a substantial middle class presence. The different class character of each passenger stream is reflected in different patterns of growth. Whereas passenger numbers in cabin class show steady but mainly unspectacular growth rates, steerage numbers fluctuate widely in response to economic conditions. The sharp increase in passenger volumes between 1875 and 1885 was the result of a sharp increase in steerage traffic paired with modest growth in cabin passenger numbers.

I argue that American travel patterns evolved through the intersection of domestic inequalities with globalization. Working class Americans in steerage were disproportionately drawn from among the foreign born. They had arrived in America as part of the great migration that was the most prominent feature of globalization. Their extended family networks made temporary return to the home country attractive whenever an economic recession in the United States led to job losses. In contrast, American "tourists" in cabin class were largely insulated from the consequences of business cycles. Their wealth, much of it newly acquired, allowed them to travel for pleasure, creating a market for European luxury goods and developing social ties in foreign circles.

This paper draws on the data contained in nineteenth century passenger lists and statistical series based on this data, as well as press commentaries on Americans abroad. In the first section, I outline what information was contained in the lists and the summary statistics that have been generated from it, most importantly the annual series of "ocean-bound tourists." The next two sections use the passenger list data and information from other sources to examine American travelers in steerage and in cabin, respectively. The starting point is Matthew Simon's disaggregation of the "ocean-bound tourists" series into steerage and cabin passenger flows.<sup>3</sup>

Simon's work revealed that almost all of the volatility in American travel volumes was due to changes in the numbers crossing in steerage. I show that these fluctuations were responsive to business cycles while cabin numbers were not. This finding is consistent with Drew Keeling's contention that steerage passengers were not tourists but naturalized Americans engaged in "repeat migration" in response to contractions in the US labor market.<sup>4</sup> Passenger list data for a sample of late summer 1885 crossings show that American males in steerage held the kinds of low-skill occupations associated with precarious employment. A subset of these lists indicates that most Americans in steerage were naturalized citizens, likely with access in bad times to havens in their country of birth. Finally, the fact that contemporary press accounts almost wholly ignore Americans in steerage is suggestive. Had these included substantial number of budget tourists, they would likely have found a place in the extensive coverage of leisure travel.

The number of Americans traveling in cabin class to Europe was largely unaffected by business cycles until the Panic of 1893. Economic downturns did not appear to reduce either the motivation or financial resources to travel. Passenger lists do not provide information on either purpose of travel or financial status. However, a procedure developed by Cohn uses the occupational data in the lists

to generate a simple categorization of business and nonbusiness travelers or “tourists.”<sup>5</sup> I apply this method to data drawn from passenger lists for spring crossings in 1854–55 and 1875, and spring and late summer 1885. The occupational data also provides some indication of the financial status of nonbusiness travelers.

I find that business travelers declined as a proportion of Americans traveling cabin after 1875 but were still present in large numbers in 1885. The occupational data for nonbusiness travelers does not signal any substantial broadening of access to those in middle-class occupations. I use contemporary and more recent estimates of the cost of “respectable” travel in conjunction with data on income distributions at the time to assess the question of affordability. Assuming that most travelers would not spend more than a quarter of their income on a two- or three-month holiday abroad, I show that the costs of European travel would have been beyond the reach of all but a small percentage of American families. Claims in the contemporary press that “everyone is going to Europe” are misleading; the “habit” of European travel remained confined to high-income groups.

### From the Passenger Lists to “Ocean-Bound Tourists”

There are two main primary sources for information on the mass of American travelers to Europe. The first, and by far the most important, are the official passenger lists. The second consists of the comparatively rare contemporary press accounts characterizing American travelers to Europe as a whole.<sup>6</sup> I deal with press accounts as they become relevant in the sections below. The passenger lists and the statistical series derived from them require some preliminary description.

#### *The Passenger Lists*

That we have statistical data on nineteenth century American travelers is due almost wholly to legislation directed toward immigrants. Section four of *An Act to Regulate Passenger Ships and Vessels* (the “Steerage Act”), passed in 1819, required masters of ships arriving in American ports to submit lists of all passengers showing “the age, sex, and occupation of the said passengers respectively; the country to which they severally belong, and that to which it is their intention to become inhabitants.”<sup>7</sup> From 1855, the lists were required to distinguish cabin from steerage passengers. In 1882, new legislation required that both native country and country of citizenship be shown for steerage passengers.<sup>8</sup> Thanks to this requirement, the researcher can distinguish naturalized citizens from the native born. In most cases it is also possible to identify whether a passenger was traveling alone or with other family members, and in the latter case, to determine the relationships among members of the travel group. Family members traveling together are grouped together in the passenger lists, and for women and minors, the occupation column is used to designate family status (e.g., spinster, wife, child, infant).

The Customs Lists of Passengers are the foundation for quantitative research on American travelers.<sup>9</sup> However, turning the handwritten entries into the coded, machine-readable files required for statistical analysis is difficult and

highly labor intensive.<sup>10</sup> In practice, very few studies have attempted the task. Raymond L. Cohn's 1992 article "Transatlantic U.S. Passenger Travel at the Dawn of the Steamship Era" appears to be the only recent large scale study to use the detailed information in the passenger lists.<sup>11</sup>

Apart from Cohn's work, almost all recent statistical research on nineteenth-century American travelers has been based not on the original customs passenger lists but on nineteenth-century statistical summaries. These offer a very narrow window on the information contained in the original lists and one mainly focused on immigrants. Data on the numbers and gender of American travelers initially appeared in the Immigration sections of the *Quarterly and the Annual Reports of the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Department of the Treasury* as part of an introductory table on passenger arrivals.<sup>12</sup> In 1890, the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* added a table on the passenger arrivals data in the Annual Reports that contained time series for US citizens returning, nonimmigrant aliens, and immigrants by customs district.<sup>13</sup> A new series called "ocean-bound tourists" was derived from the arrivals data in two coordinated papers on the United States balance of payments by Douglas North (covering 1790–1860) and Matthew Simon (covering 1861–1900), published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).<sup>14</sup> The new series was obtained by increasing the arrivals numbers by three percent, an estimate of those who had departed that year but had failed to return due to health issues, death, or other factors. The underlying assumption was that Americans generally spent (considerably) less than a year in Europe. No reason was offered, however, for adopting the "tourist" label. The series first appears in Simon's paper though only for the years 1873 to 1894. The full series was subsequently incorporated into the *Historical Statistics of the United States* as "ocean-bound tourists."<sup>15</sup> The "ocean-bound tourist" series is the starting point for two major NBER papers, "The American Invasion of Europe, The Long Term Rise in Overseas Travel 1820–2000" (2008) and "Fluctuations in Overseas Travel by Americans, 1820 to 2000" (2009) both by Brandon Dupont, Alka Gandhi, and Thomas J. Weiss.<sup>16</sup>

Both Simon, in creating the "ocean-bound tourists" series, and Dupont et al. in using it explicitly recognize that arriving passengers include, besides actual tourists, businessmen and those making family visits or traveling for other personal reasons. They consider these distinctions, however, largely extraneous to their purposes—for Simon, to estimate foreign expenditures of American travelers; for Dupont et al., to uncover the main determinants of passenger volumes.<sup>17</sup> I will argue below that these are not safe assumptions because the diversity of passengers is key to both questions.

### Americans in Steerage

Americans traveling steerage occupied a space created for and sustained by mass immigration from Europe to the United States. Steam had captured cabin class traffic from sail by mid-century and steerage traffic within the next two decades. John Killick documents the transition in a history of the Cope's Line.<sup>18</sup> Two-class steamers were the basis of a new business model that opened up the north Atlantic to renewed competition and rapid expansion.

When Simon introduced the "ocean-bound tourist" series, he also provided estimates for Europe-bound "tourists" in total and, separately, for cabin and

noncabin (essentially steerage) passengers.<sup>19</sup> For Simon, this was simply a means of fine-tuning the calculation of foreign expenditures. The estimates seem not to have been used in subsequent studies. The division, however, revealed that almost all the volatility in American passenger volumes between 1873 and 1894 was accounted for by steerage traffic, while passenger volumes in cabin class increased steadily in almost all years (see figure 1). Simon provides few details as to how he made his estimates except that these were based on custom-district aggregations rather than directly on passenger list data.<sup>20</sup> However, the pattern of high volatility in steerage and low volatility in cabin is characteristic of the total passenger departures (American and alien) from US seaports.<sup>21</sup>

The volatility of steerage traffic, both inbound and outbound, reflects fluctuations in immigrant and emigrant flows in response to changing economic conditions in the United States. Harry Jerome’s *Migration and Business Cycles*, an NBER paper undertaken to address the issues underlying passage of the restrictive 1921 Emergency Quota Act and 1924 Immigration Act, documents the relationship for the years prior to 1890.<sup>22</sup> Immigrants drawn into the American economy, even if skilled, largely found only precarious employment in low-skill jobs in industries highly vulnerable to business cycles. Networks linking immigrants to their home communities conveyed both information on employment opportunities and remittances to facilitate immigration in good times. In downturns, emigration became a means of limiting the costs of precarious employment.<sup>23</sup>

In 1876, the fourth year of the Long Depression, a *New York Times* article made the sobering observation that outbound steerage traffic had outstripped incoming immigration for the previous two years:

These returning emigrants consist of two classes; those who are suffering from want of remunerative employment and hope to better their condition in the




Figure 1. Estimated Number of Americans Traveling to Europe in Cabin and Noncabin Accommodation. Source: Matthew Simon. *The United States Balance of Payments 1861–1900* (NBER, 1960), table 15.

old country, and those who have established themselves in business here, and have accumulated sufficient means to enable them to revisit their native land for the pleasure of the trip, or from motives of social gratification. About seventy-five per cent probably belong to the former class and twenty-five to the latter.<sup>24</sup>

No sources are cited for these figures. However, Hyde reports a similar estimate made by the *Liverpool Journal of Commerce* in October 1875: of passengers returning to Liverpool (unspecified by class), 7 percent were tourists, 23 percent businessmen, and 70 percent “disappointed emigrants.”<sup>25</sup>


Keeling, in a 2010 article on “repeat migration,” argues that Americans in steerage, mainly naturalized citizens, were a part of this movement.

U.S. citizens in steerage were not on summer sightseeing tours of Europe as citizens in first class were. . . . nearly all U.S. citizens in steerage were naturalized Europeans, not native-born Americans, that their crossings were mostly round-trips to America to (and back from) small villages in Europe and that on the westbound traverse they often accompanied non-citizen relatives from those villages who were migrating to the United States for the first time.<sup>26</sup>

If this is the case, there should be a close correspondence between the fluctuations in Simon’s series of Americans in noncabin and emigrant traffic outbound.<sup>27</sup> Emigration statistics are unavailable before 1907; here I follow Jerome in using outbound steerage passenger counts and subtracting Simon’s estimates of Americans in steerage. Figure 2 shows Simon’s estimates of American departures in noncabin (based on arrival figures) and total recorded noncabin departures minus Simon’s estimates. The latter series represents emigrant departures. These series are shown over the Long Depression from September 1873 to March 1879 and the recovery to February 1882 and the subsequent shorter and shallower contraction from March 1882 to May 1885 followed by recovery to February 1887.<sup>28</sup> For the short 1882–87 cycle, the graph shows the expected pattern.<sup>29</sup> Emigrant and American noncabin departures both increased in the contraction from 1882–85, and both fell with the recovery to 1886.

No such simple pattern appeared over the Long Depression. Far from coinciding, the emigrant and American series moved in opposite directions at almost all points in the cycle. Emigrant departures rose very sharply from 1873 to 1874 while American departures abruptly dropped off. As the economic contraction worsened, annual emigrant departures actually declined while American departures slowly increased with a brief dip in 1878. In the economic upturn from spring of 1879, emigrant departures increased while American departures declined.<sup>30</sup>

Much is anomalous here in terms of a simple push-pull model of the impact of economic conditions on emigrant flows; however, our concern is limited to the apparent contrary movements of the two series. This pattern may reflect a problem in estimating departures from arrivals during prolonged depressions. The spike in emigrant departures for 1874 coincided with a sharp increase in unemployment in the first year of the Long Depression.<sup>31</sup> The simultaneous decline in estimated American departures may, in fact, have been an artifact of the impact of the downturn on American arrivals. Rapidly worsening labor market conditions would have depressed arrival figures as Americans who departed



**Figure 2.** Total Non-American Steerage Passengers Outbound Number of Americans Traveling to Europe in Non-Cabin. Sources: Matthew Simon. The United States Balance of Payments 1861–1900 (NBER, 1960), table 15. Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department, Arrivals of Alien Passengers and Immigrants to US, 1820–1892 (Washington, 1893) No. 18 Statement Showing the Number of Cabin and Other Passengers Departed from the Seaports of the United States for Foreign Countries, etc., during Each Year Ending June 30, from 1868 to 1892, Inclusive.

in 1874 and earlier postponed their return. Thus what appears as a decline in departures might in reality have been an increase in failures to return; American departures may actually have increased in tandem with those of emigrants. Similarly, the apparent increase in American departures after 1874 may instead signify increasing returns from abroad.<sup>32</sup>

*Occupations, Incomes, and Travel Costs*

Keeling is not explicit about immigrants’ position in the American labor market; however Jerome’s earlier NBER study on migration and business cycles indicates that most immigrants and emigrants were in unskilled and semiskilled occupations.<sup>33</sup> This is supported by a more recent study by O’Rourke and Williamson.<sup>34</sup> We would expect Americans in steerage to hold similar types of occupations. If, on the other hand, a substantial number were tourists, we should find “students, teachers and preachers” well represented. These are generally taken as the vanguard groups of budget tourism.<sup>35</sup> Data drawn from a sample of passenger lists allows a test of Keeling’s claim.

The passenger list data used here are for eighteen crossings from Liverpool to New York between August 24 and September 19, 1885 by liners of the British-registered Cunard, Guion, Inman, National, and White Star Lines.<sup>36</sup>

Late summer crossings brought a rush of American travelers home from Europe vacations. If there were low budget American tourists traveling steerage, they should be concentrated on these crossings<sup>37</sup>

Table 1 shows the occupational distributions of working age (18 to 65) American males in first cabin, second cabin/intermediate, and steerage. First cabin is dealt with in the next section. Second cabin on British-registered ships at this time was essentially the upper tier of steerage.<sup>38</sup> I anticipated that second cabin occupations would mirror those in steerage; in fact, each accommodation class has its own distinct profile. As expected, steerage is dominated by laborers; almost three-quarters of working-age males are in this category. Most of the rest are farmers or skilled tradesmen. Both of these latter groups are much more heavily represented in second cabin, where they are joined by a group barely noticeable in steerage, clerks, including both office and sales workers. Notable by their absence in both steerage and second cabin are the bellwethers of budget travel—students, clergymen, teachers, and academics.

The differences in occupational profiles between second cabin and steerage passengers correspond to differences in economic status. Sobrek, drawing from multiple sources, estimates average 1890s income as \$395 for laborers (\$178 for farm laborers) versus \$614 for craftsmen, \$611 for clerical workers, and \$723 for sales workers.<sup>39</sup> He estimates average income for farmers as only \$234. However, average income figures can mask the presence of better-off subpopulations.<sup>40</sup> A July 1882 *New York Times* article noted: “there are a large number of Germans, who have been successful on Western farms, who are going home in first or second cabins for a brief visit.”<sup>41</sup>

Table 1. Percentage Distribution of Occupations of Working Age (18–65) Male US Citizens by Travel Class.\*

	First Cabin	Second Cabin	Steerage
Merchants (incl. agents, brokers, dealers)	38.9	10.6	0.7
Bankers (incl. insurance, real estate, stockbrokers)	3.3	0.0	0.0
Builders, manufacturers	4.4	0.0	0.0
Farmers (incl. ranchers)	0.8	31.4	12.1
Captains, Managers, mostly shipping, railways	1.1	0.0	0.0
Lawyers, clergy, engineers (also physicians, military, accountants)	20.4	2.7	0.7
Artists, musicians, journalists	2.9	0.5	0.2
Clerks (incl. bookkeepers)	2.3	21.3	1.2
Skilled trades (nurse, joiner, barber, carpenter, etc)	1.3	17.6	8.5
Labourers, miners, stewards	0.2	6.4	74.2
Servants	0.6	1.1	1.7
Students	5.2	0.0	0.0
Gentleman	18.2	8.0	0.2
Traveller	0.4	0.5	0.5
Total	100	100	100
Count	1020	188	416

\*Liverpool to New York, British-Registered liners August 24–September 21, 1885.



Simon estimates the travel costs of noncabin tourists at \$420 in 1890 (\$70 for transport; \$350 for “maintenance”), in other words, larger than the average annual income of laborers and over half the annual average income for other occupational categories.<sup>42</sup> This does not rule out the existence of better off subgroups like the German farmers with incomes sufficient for budget travel. In contrast, the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department in 1889 estimated the “average amount expended . . . by third class passengers” departing New York for Europe at \$150.<sup>43</sup> The Bureau seems likely to have had a different type of traveler in mind, one closer to Keeling’s version than Simon’s.

The occupational differences between second cabin and steerage suggest some price sensitivity. In 1885, British registered lines were able to market second cabin / intermediate class at fares that were about double those of main steerage and about half the lowest first cabin fares. Inman, for example, in early June offered first cabin passage from \$60, \$80, and \$100, intermediate at \$35, and steerage at \$15. Published fares for other lines were similar.<sup>44</sup>

This raises the question of whether the fluctuations in numbers of noncabin American travelers were influenced by price changes. Unfortunately, most recent research on the relationship of fares to travel volumes is not directly applicable to the question. Dupont et al. have developed regression models for overall pre-WWI American travel patterns (derived from the ocean tourists series) that incorporates both first-class fares and measures of economic conditions among predictor variables. They conclude that “the relatively small effects of income, direct and indirect prices of travel, and exchange rates” indicate a travel population largely insulated from “real economic variables,” meaning the very wealthy.<sup>45</sup> The limited impact of changes in economic conditions is much more reflective of first class travel patterns than those in steerage. This conclusion reflects the authors’ reliance on the ocean tourist series, which to a degree smooths out the sharp fluctuations in steerage numbers, as well as their use of first-class fares as an indicator of changes in the price of travel, which fails to capture the volatility of steerage fares due to rate wars.

Keeling’s study of the 1904 fare war is virtually unique in assessing the impact of a fare reduction on steerage travel by naturalized Americans.<sup>46</sup> The results, however, need to be interpreted in the context of the larger debate over cartelized steerage fares. Keeling has long argued that steerage fares had little impact on traffic flows for westbound immigrant traffic on the basis that both reflect the impact of economic cycles. Fare wars in 1874–75, 1884–85, and 1893–94 resulted from increased competition for shrinking pools of immigrants during American recessions.<sup>47</sup> Fares and westbound immigrant numbers fell together. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the relationship between the business cycle, steerage fares, and passenger volumes was markedly different. In 1904, a major price war resulted from competition for continental immigrant traffic. This coincided with a minor recession but was not a result of it. The fall in prices met with a substantial increase in immigrant traffic. In 1908, a severe recession did result in reduced immigrant traffic but no sustained drop in prices. The lines had finally learned to avoid a price war in the face of falling demand.<sup>48</sup> Deltas, Sicotte, and Tomczak have built a regression model showing that by supporting prices above open market levels, shipping cartels reduced steerage traffic by 20 percent below what it would have been under competitive conditions between 1899 and 1911.<sup>49</sup>

Keeling's own study of the 1904 fare war concludes that lower fares sparked an increase in first-time migrants; there is a greater impact, however, on repeat migration, including by naturalized Americans. Lower fares appear to have sparked short term visits home, concluded within a year. The mild recession provided little incentive to go but also little reason to linger in the home country. The more severe recessions of the late nineteenth century provided both. Moreover, reductions in fares were themselves an indirect consequence of economic downturns. Whether fluctuations in fares due to the instability of the cartels had an impact on the volume of American steerage passengers independent of the economic cycle is unanswerable from current research. However, it seems evident that the scope for such effects was much narrower in the late nineteenth century than in the first decade of the twentieth.

### *Naturalized Americans*

Although after 1882 lines were required to record both native country and country of citizenship for steerage passengers, compliance was minimal even by 1885, as Keeling warns. There seems to have been genuine confusion as to what requirements were.<sup>50</sup> Also, in 1882 a "head tax" was introduced requiring steamship companies to contribute half a dollar for every non-US citizen landed. In some cases categorizing passengers as liable or not liable for the tax took priority over gathering other information.<sup>51</sup>

In our summer 1885 sample, only four passenger lists for crossings carrying American steerage passengers, all by Cunard liners, used a form explicitly distinguishing native country from citizenship. Of the ninety Americans carried, seventy-four were listed as naturalized citizens.<sup>52</sup> Additionally, in both second cabin and steerage lists for Inman's *City of Chester*, the column for country of citizenship appears to have been used to indicate native country since it is discrepant with a second column indicating US citizenship. On these lists, thirty-five of the thirty-eight Americans in second cabin and sixty-two of the sixty-eight in steerage are shown as naturalized citizens.<sup>53</sup> Over three-quarters of naturalized Americans traveling steerage on British registered liners were, unsurprisingly, British-born, mainly in England or Ireland.

I have been largely unsuccessful in locating passenger lists for other north Atlantic crossings that clearly distinguished country of citizenship from native country. The exceptions were three crossings by Red Star liners (a Belgian-American company) from Antwerp to New York. On these crossings, of the 303 Americans traveling steerage, 297 were naturalized citizens.<sup>54</sup>

While Keeling is likely correct in claiming that most Americans in steerage were naturalized, a further prediction that they would frequently be returning with relatives who were foreign citizens is not supported by the passenger lists.<sup>55</sup> Mixed family groups constitute less than two percent in all passenger classes, less than four percent if we exclude single-person households from the base. On this measure, steerage and second cabin differ little from first cabin.

### *The Invisibility of Americans in Steerage*

Press accounts of the annual exodus to Europe make no reference to budget tourists traveling steerage. In fact, the only Americans recognized in steerage are

cabin passengers there through misadventure. In August 1875, the *New York Times* reported that a Massachusetts school teacher was forced to return home in steerage when her letter of credit became worthless with the failure of a New York banking firm. A September 1900 article entitled "Tourists in the Steerage" reported the protests against vaccination made by American tourists forced to return in steerage due to a shortage of cabin accommodation.<sup>56</sup> Only in September 1910, did the *New York Times* report that large numbers of Americans were returning from Europe in steerage. "Many it is said are Americans who had saved up money for a trip abroad and went over first or second class, but went 'broke' and when the time came to come back had to take the cheapest package."<sup>57</sup> But the report also suggested that steerage accommodation had improved to the point where it was acceptable for budget-minded American tourists.<sup>58</sup>

In 1875, the year that the unfortunate school teacher returned home in steerage, 11,300 Americans, by Simon's estimate, did likewise. How is it that they were overlooked by the premier newspaper in the premier port for European travel? It is likely that the paper did not so much overlook as disregard distinctions in legal status among foreign-born steerage passengers. The main story point was that these were immigrants traveling to their home countries and that they might or might not return to the United States. Almost the only time naturalized citizens abroad were explicitly acknowledged in news stories was when their status as Americans became a matter of contention through the actions of foreign governments.

Finally, there are few, if any, travel guides for budget travelers. The apparent exceptions are not for middle-class tourists. Meriwether's *A Tramp Trip—How to See Europe on Fifty Cents a Day* is a record of living at the level of local working class residents compiled while researching labor conditions for the US Department of Interior. "Traveling without Money," a chapter in Thomas Knox's popular 1883 *How to Travel*, describes American hangers-on who live by chicanery, preying on mainstream American tourists and consular officials. The *New York Times* did, however, offer advice on living cheap in London without losing (much) self-respect.<sup>59</sup>

Absence of evidence is not conclusive evidence of absence. It is possible that budget tourists crossed in numbers in the 1880s but were not deemed of interest by the "quality" press or a viable market by travel book publishers. Yet this seems unlikely given that summer travel to Europe was increasingly portrayed as a popular rather than elite activity. Neither the demographics of American steerage passengers nor the estimated costs of "respectable" budget tourism support the notion of a hidden pool of lower-income tourists.

### Americans in First Cabin

Those in steerage were included in the counts of American travelers to Europe but not in most mainstream representations of who those travelers were. These representations were dominated by those in cabin class. Two categories of traveler dominate both accounts at the time and the historical literature: business travelers and tourists, the former seen as diminishing in significance and

devoid of interest. The *New York Times* in 1866 described the postwar surge in American travel as follows:

Absolute business requirements compel many of our citizens to go abroad once or twice every year, and these do so, for the most part, as they would perform any habitual routine duty. Scientific and literary researches call a few away from home, but the majority of those who have recently made up the bulk of English steamer passengers are pure pleasure seekers, disenthralled from the anxious restraints which, for the past five years.<sup>60</sup>

In this section, I focus on two questions: first, what was the balance between business travelers and tourists in cabin class, and second, what was the class composition of tourists. Here, as in much of the literature, I use “tourist” to cover all nonbusiness travel. The two issues are linked by an early debate over the social composition of American travelers. Protectionists portrayed these “absentees” from the American market as predominantly wealthy tourists spending vast sums abroad. This was challenged on the grounds that there were not, in fact, sufficient numbers of the wealthy to account for the large number of travelers.

Simon’s series tells us that cabin traffic was relatively unresponsive to the business cycle, at least until the Panic of 1893. Over the Long Depression, cabin class traffic substantially declined in only one year, 1877, and this may have been a result of the disputed 1876 presidential election rather than the economic downturn.<sup>61</sup> Hyde notes that cabin class revenues offered some stability for Cunard in the Long Depression as steerage traffic plummeted.<sup>62</sup> Cabin passengers, then, were drawn from populations for whom the motivation to travel and the affordability of doing so were largely unaffected by changing economic conditions. However, circumstances differ by category. Travel costs as business expenses were likely covered or subsidized by the firm; tourist travel was dependent on personal or family resources.

### *Business Travelers*

Nineteenth-century travelers were not asked their reason for travel. Cohn, however, in his study of Americans crossing by sail, developed a heuristic method of imputing this for family heads mainly on the basis of occupation. Cohn first identifies occupations that plausibly might imply travel “on business” or on government matters. The residual, including “gentlemen,” are consigned to the tourist category “defined broadly to include not only sightseeing but visits to family and friends and the travel of students.”<sup>63</sup> Those initially coded as traveling “on business” who are accompanied by family are deemed to have a dual purpose of business and tourism. Finally, family groups that include non-Americans as well as Americans are categorized as engaged in “family retrieval,” that is bringing other relatives to the United States as immigrants.<sup>64</sup> For my analysis, I have reduced the categories to tourist, business traveler, and mixed, as few passengers are government officials or traveling with non-American relatives.<sup>65</sup> While it is easy to find fault with this approach, given the limited information available, it is hard to see a better alternative. It is worth noting that the German Line, *Nordeutscher Lloyd*, utilized a simple dichotomy merchant/tourist for adult males in first and second cabin on some crossings in 1885.<sup>66</sup>

The passenger list data used in this section are again for crossings from Liverpool to New York on British-registered lines. The samples consist of 593 Americans on seventeen spring crossings by Cunard and Collins liners (the latter an American-registered company) in 1854, 1855, and 1856; 615 on twenty-four spring crossings by Cunard, Inman, National, and White Star ships in 1875; and 755 on twenty-seven spring crossings by the same lines plus Guion in 1885 as well as the summer 1885 crossings.<sup>67</sup>

The same improvements in transatlantic shipping that allowed mass migration to America also opened the US domestic market to increasing competition from foreign goods. Even as foreign labor was allowed to enter the country freely in the late nineteenth century, American trade policy erected high tariff walls in order to restrict the importation of foreign manufactures and protect American industry.<sup>68</sup> Protectionism was a key element in a pattern of international trade that likely dampened the incentives for business travel by Americans in the 1870s and 1880s.

We look in vain for a history of transatlantic business travel in the late nineteenth century. Rarely studied directly, business travel is assumed to have declined in importance after the Civil War with the growth of large, vertically integrated business organizations and, in particular, the consolidation of wholesale and retail trade.<sup>69</sup> Chapman in *Merchant Enterprise*, cites the cabling of the North Atlantic from 1866 as allowing direct communication to supplant personalized networks of intermediaries.<sup>70</sup>

The impact of the above changes in business organization and communications was likely amplified by American trade patterns.<sup>71</sup> US exports were dominated by bulk commodities—raw materials and foodstuffs—where standard grading, centralized trading exchanges, and futures contracts facilitated commerce with a minimum of personal mediation.<sup>72</sup> Business travel remained important in the case of consumer goods due to continuing product differentiation and changing consumer tastes. In the 1890s, this was evident in the waves of buyers sent to Europe by the new American department stores.<sup>73</sup> However, American trade and tariff policy constrained this trade.<sup>74</sup> It is notable that in the 1870s and 1880s, the ire of the protectionists seemed directed less at merchants than at direct importing by American tourists. This suggests that international commercial networks were underdeveloped relative to American demand for foreign-made consumer goods.

Table 2 shows the distribution of American cabin passengers by occupation of head of family for the three sampled periods. At mid-century, over 40 percent of American cabin passengers were either merchants or traveling in family groups headed by merchants. This proportion still held in 1875, but by 1885, it had fallen to less than 30 percent on both spring and summer crossings. Even in 1885, however, merchants remained the single largest occupational category on the passenger lists. It should be noted that passengers on crossings in 1875 and 1885 would have made their travel decisions in the midst of American recessions.

### *The Tourists: Class Composition*

The continuing presence of business travelers is important in addressing an early debate about the class character of American tourists. In a May 1895

Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Family Group Members Categorized Occupation of Head.\*

	1854-56 (spring)	1875 (spring)	1885 (spring)	1885 (summer)
Merchants alone (incl. agents, brokers, dealers)	29.2	22.1	15.8	12.7
Merchants with family (incl. agents, brokers, dealers)	15.5	20.4	7.9	16.5
Bankers (incl. insurance, real estate, stockbrokers)	0.2	2.1	3.3	2.6
Builders, manufacturers	1.0	0.6	1.7	4.1
Farmers (incl. ranchers)	2.1	1.9	4.0	0.5
Captains, Managers, mostly shipping, railways	1.9	0.6	0.2	0.7
Lawyers, clergy, engineers (also physicians, military, diplomats, accountants)	11.8	11.9	11.2	15.3
Artists, musicians, journalists	0.7	2.9	5.0	2.1
Clerks (incl. bookkeepers)	1.4	0.8	1.5	1.4
Skilled trades (nurse, joiner, barber, carpenter, etc.)	5.2	1.7	1.2	1.1
Labourers, miners, stewards	0.3	1.0	0.0	0.1
Servants	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.8
Students	0.2	0.4	1.5	2.1
Gentleman	10.1	13.8	20.8	14.7
Traveller	0.3	1.0	2.3	0.2
Women, no paid occupatoin	13.7	15.8	19.8	20.8
Minor(s) traveling unaccompanied	1.0	1.0	0.4	1.1
Indecipherable women, missing indecipherable men	4.9	1.9	2.5	2.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
Count	575	480	481	2007

\*Liverpool to New York, British-Registered liners March–May 1854–6, 1875, 1885 and August 24–September 21, 1885.

article, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* argued that most American travelers could not possibly be wealthy since there were far too few rich citizens to account for the volume of cabin passengers going abroad. This was in response to protectionist claims that the rich were draining purchasing power out of the American economy. The wealthy, and particularly the nouveau riche created by the Civil War, “developed the germs of flunkeyism” and began the pattern of European travel and preference for European culture and goods over American. Their malign influence “spread among all classes of the wealthier portion of the community.”<sup>75</sup> In challenging this view, the *Chronicle* claimed that estimates of expenditures abroad were far too high.

The *Chronicle* cited figures of 75,000 cabin class travelers to be accounted for from 150,000 high-income households with incomes above \$4500 in the United States, representing a participation rate of 50 percent.<sup>76</sup> I have been unable to trace the source for the number of high income households; however, it is approximately congruent with the estimate in an 1896 study by Staphr that 200,000 families, representing less than two percent of all families, had incomes of \$5000 or more.<sup>77</sup>

The passenger figure is, however, inflated, due to an error in the original (uncited) source, the *Report of the Director of the Mint* for fiscal year 1889. The document misreported the total number for cabin passengers as the number of Americans. The figure cited is 77,590 later revised upward to 82,019; Simon’s estimate of Americans traveling cabin in 1889 is 61,900.<sup>78</sup> Second, the *Chronicle* makes no adjustment for business travelers whose expenditures are business expenses not personal consumption. Using the proportion of nonbusiness travelers and average family group size derived from our 1885 passenger list data, I estimate that in 1889, American cabin passengers traveling for wholly nonbusiness reasons, totaled 49,830 individuals in 33,969 family groups. If these were all drawn from 150,000 high income households, then the participation rate would be 23 percent. Including those traveling for a mix of business and nonbusiness reasons increases the percentage to 25.1.<sup>79</sup>

Even a 25 percent participation rate may seem unreasonably high. In the 1880s, the total number of American overseas passengers in all classes represented less than two tenths of one percent of the US population.<sup>80</sup> Yet popular claims at the time that “everyone” was going to Europe implicitly point to a restricted social group where transatlantic travel actually was a common experience. Mark Twain captures this implicit self-contradiction early in *The Innocents Abroad*. Twain writes early in the second chapter:

I basked in the happiness of being for once in my life drifting with the tide of a great popular movement. Everybody was going to Europe—I, too, was going to Europe. Everybody was going to the famous Paris Exposition—I, too, was going to the Paris Exposition.

But he immediately undercuts his own expansive statement with a satirical sketch of Mr. Bucher, a fellow excursionist who thinks literally “everyone” is Europe-bound. Attempting to purchase a handkerchief in a Broadway shop, Bucher finds the clerk cannot make change. He tells the clerk “Never mind, I’ll hand it to you in Paris” and is astonished when the man says he is not going to Paris, or indeed anywhere. Bucher confides to Twain as they leave that the clerk must be lying.

What Twain satirizes is offered without apparent irony in the contemporary press. An 1875 *New York Times* piece reported:

During the last ten years, it may almost be said that it has become the rule with people to take two or three month's holiday and go abroad. All classes now share in this yearly rush from America. A woman evidently without education, and one would suppose of very limited means, who testified in the Beecher case the other day, mentioned incidentally that she went over to Europe last Summer to "do her shopping." And that now seems to be growing into a national custom. It is no longer confined to the few . . . and is followed by everyone who can manage to spend two or three thousand dollars and upwards on a Summer vacation.<sup>81</sup>

European travel—for a certain class—is reported as a way of saving money. In 1869, the *New York Times* noted:

The truth is that European travel may often be rather an *economical* move. It costs very little more, if one knows how to manage, to pass the Summer in Europe than it does to pass it in the fashionable resorts of America. . . . A somewhat eccentric gentleman was accustomed to make frequent journeys to England and France, and always professed that his object was to "buy clothes"—and certainly he could figure out a profit, in the decreased costs of his somewhat extensive wardrobes. . . . Many people whose villas were wont to be the resort of City friends from May to November, will be found to have *escaped* to Europe.<sup>82</sup>

A similar piece in the summer of 1885, "A Merchant's Philosophical Suggestions—He Saves Money by Sending His Family to Europe" describes how "the head of one of the biggest linen houses in the city" finds it cheaper to put his family up in a coastal English town than an American resort.<sup>83</sup> It is more than ironic that sending the family to Europe is a cost-saving strategy for both the elite and for the precariously employed at the bottom of the social order.

Such press accounts as the above are, however, comparatively rare and supported by little beyond the impressions of the writers. They thus need to be treated with caution. The passenger list data, however, provides support from a more objective source. As [table 2](#) shows, Bucher's clerk was no more likely in 1885 to be Europe-bound (in cabin at least) than thirty years earlier. The occupational distribution of cabin passengers does not show any substantial increase in middle class occupations. The proportion of passengers in family groups headed by clerks or skilled workers is virtually unchanged in 1885 from a decade earlier. The same is true for professionals on spring crossings, though the proportion is somewhat higher in summer. While the spring distributions suggest a sharp increase in gentlemen this is not sustained on summer crossings.<sup>84</sup>

The "innocents" making the excursion with Twain on the *Quaker City* paid \$1250 in currency (greenbacks) and were advised to budget five dollars in gold per day for expenses over the three-month trip. The *New York Tribune* provided Twain with the equivalent of \$1944 in currency for fare and expenses. Based on income tax returns for 1867, about one percent of adult (20 years or older) males would have registered this amount as their total taxable income.<sup>85</sup>

Twain's was a high-end excursion. The per-traveler figure disputed by the *Chronicle*, attributed to the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department, is



that: "Americans who cross the ocean every year spend on the average for passage money, traveling expenses, board, personal clothing and sundries \$1000 each."<sup>86</sup> Simon comments that "The extreme difficulty of estimating annual tourist outlays in the late nineteenth century has been reflected in the development of a primitive type of 'round number' mythology."<sup>87</sup> The \$1000 average for cabin class expenditures is the classic case.

Simon cites its early appearance in the 1869 Report of the Special Commissioner for Revenue for the purpose of computing foreign expenditures abroad. He provisionally accepts this estimate in his 1955 thesis but in his 1960 NBER paper notes that the Report simply "assumed" the figure and replaces it with estimates based on examination of tourist industry documents.<sup>88</sup> In the late nineteenth century, however, the figure seems to have taken on a life of its own, if only as the starting point for disputation. A protectionist in 1875 states: "Gentlemen who are in a position to speak authoritatively . . . say that the average European tourist spends a great deal more than a thousand dollars in articles he could just as well purchase at home."<sup>89</sup> In contrast, an 1877 *New York Times* article on letters of credit cites "a modest \$1000 or so to a tourist's credit."<sup>90</sup> Having it all ways, an 1882 report in *Galignani's Messenger*, republished in the *New York Times*, indicated that cabin passengers on average take "spending money of at least \$3000 each"; that "many estimate the cost of a four months' tour at \$1000"; and that "one can get by very comfortably for less than half that sum . . . if one has no objection to general economy."<sup>91</sup> Apparently most cabin class tourists did.

The \$1000 figure is almost universally termed an "average," implying a distribution of higher and lower amounts. Protectionists maintain that the distribution is skewed toward much higher expenditures such that the average itself, is understated. The *Chronicle* conjures up a mass of hitherto unseen budget tourists (in cabin class) constituting the bulk of the distribution and justifying an average well below \$1000.<sup>92</sup> Typically, however, the supposed distribution is ignored and the "average" is treated essentially as a "norm" for respectable travel.

The plausibility of the \$1000 figure relies on the authority of "gentlemen in a position to know" including those in the Bureau of Statistics. The cost of Cook's tours provides one concrete check on the estimate. An 1873 advertisement in the *New York Times* offered a 105-day Cook's tour of Vienna and Italy, priced at \$750 in gold. The firm's *Excursionist* in 1884 advertised a three-and-a-half-month European tour for \$650, including ocean passage; \$500 bought ten weeks in Spain and Algeria; \$850, a 100-day tour of Scandinavia, Russia, and central Europe.<sup>93</sup> Simon's 1960 article includes estimates of average outlays based on a review of travel industry documents of the time. Average expenditures are set at \$625 in 1875, \$690 in 1885, and \$755 by 1890, assuming a 65-day stay.<sup>94</sup> Both Cook's Tour prices and Simon's estimates, however, exclude sundry purchases such as souvenirs, meals outside hotels not covered by coupons, and personal services. The higher Bureau of Statistics' and other unofficial estimates of \$1000, in contrast, appear to include such purchases. Thus, the differences in estimates are narrower than they first appear.

The *Chronicle's* argument makes an implicit connection between travel costs and annual income; it essentially assumes that only people with an annual income of at least \$4500 might be expected to spend \$1000 on a trip to Europe. We can turn this into a rule of thumb to the effect that the minimum level of

income required to contemplate a European excursion is four times the cost of the trip. If we apply this admittedly crude standard, then the bare bones (sundries excluded) \$625 travel cost Simon estimates for 1873, translates to a minimum income of \$2500. Studies by Soltow and later Stelzner, of data drawn from income tax returns for the late 1860s, 1870, and 1871, indicate about one percent of adult American males had incomes in excess of \$2000; half a percent had incomes exceeding \$2800.<sup>95</sup>

For the 1890s we can juxtapose Simon's estimates of average outlays to Staphr's 1896 estimate that 200,000 families, representing less than two percent of all families, had incomes of \$5000 or more, and 1,500,000 families, 12 percent of families, had incomes of \$1200 or more.<sup>96</sup> Simon estimates travel costs of \$755 for a cabin class tourist in 1893, suggesting that would-be tourists needed a minimum income of just over \$3000 or \$6000 for a party consisting of two adults. Interpolating for the interval between \$1200 and \$5000, I estimate that seven percent of families had incomes of \$3000 or more. Thus, only seven percent of families had the income to send one traveler to Europe; less than two percent could support a couple traveling together.<sup>97</sup>

Finally, beyond excluding sundries, none of the above estimates takes any account of opportunity costs. The linen merchant who sent his family to England as a cost saving measure indicated that he had stayed behind because summer was his busy season. In other words, the opportunity cost of joining his family was too high. It seems assumed that most cabin class tourists were either rentiers whose income was not tied to paid labor or gentlemen of sufficiently high position that they could safely leave their enterprises to run without them for an extended period of time. (It should be noted that very few cabin passengers were of retirement age, and the proportion did not substantially increase over time.) For the vast majority of potential middle-class tourists, be they defined as small business men and professionals or clerks and skilled workers, opportunity costs cannot be assumed away.

### Money, Status and Engagement

The essence of the "tourist" is a lack of real engagement with the societies they visit. This is the theme of Boorstein's distinction between tourist and traveler and it found repeated expression in the columns of the *New York Times*.<sup>98</sup> As prominent, however, were concerns about the form of engagement. For protectionists, profligate expenditures by Americans abroad reflected an unseemly infatuation with European aristocracy. It was but a short step to pursuing entry into aristocratic circles. In 1887, the American consul in London issued an "uncompromising" circular in response to "a rush of American ladies . . . all panting to be presented to the Queen." Courtship and intermarriage between American women and titled European men was a continuing topic of commentary, usually negative, over the period.<sup>99</sup>

Marriages of American women into the British aristocracy and gentry have been the subject of two major studies.<sup>100</sup> Both successfully challenge crude popular characterizations of American money being bartered for the prestige of British titles. Both make clear that the phenomenon was embedded in a much broader social movement, which Richard Davis describes as "the merging of two high societies, whose members were coming to play, and sometimes to work,

together.” An observer in 1878 noted that “[London] Society here to-day is a widely different structure from what it was twenty-five years ago. Then it was provincial; now it is cosmopolitan.”<sup>101</sup>

By the 1880s, reports of “Americans abroad” described them as a fixture of the London season. The *New York Times* reported their engagement in a variety of venues: the theatre, clubland, sports (still dominated by gentlemen amateurs), and the art world. Often these accounts revealed English resistance to the American “invasion,” such as discrimination in access to elite hotels or London clubs. There is little doubt, however, that regular American visitors had established an enduring presence.<sup>102</sup>

## Conclusion

Postbellum American travelers to Europe bore the stamp of the economic inequality that increasingly characterized their society. Growing numbers of wealthy Americans adopted the “habit” of European travel for pleasure and substantial numbers made social connections, even marriages, abroad. American merchants, dominant among cabin passengers at mid-century, continued to cross in numbers. In steerage, mainly naturalized American citizens, precariously employed in the US, crossed to Europe in numbers that fluctuated widely in response to changing conditions in the labor market. Press accounts of steerage traffic failed to capture these movements. Like Keeling in his analysis of repeat migration, the contemporary press discounted distinctions in legal status in favor of what was common to all returning immigrants, their continued ties to their home countries.

These, collectively, are the “ocean-bound tourists” of official statistics. There undoubtedly were stereotypical tourists in abundance in cabin class, and the contemporary press lamented their foibles and proffered advice. But the label has obscured the diversity of American travelers, the social disparities among them, and the extent to which their passage signaled involvement in social and economic networks spanning the Atlantic.

## Endnotes

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1. Figures are taken from the “ocean-bound tourists” series, whose provenance is explained in the next section.

2. Jeffrey Steinbrink, “Why the Innocents Went Abroad: Mark Twain and American Tourism in the Late Nineteenth Century,” *American Literary Realism* 16 (autumn, 1983): 279.

3. Matthew Simon, “The United States Balance of Payments, 1861–1900.” See also the companion paper, Douglas C. North, “The United States Balance of Payments, 1790–1860.” Both are found in the National Bureau of Economic Research: *Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (1960) available from the NBER website: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2491> and <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2492>, accessed July 12, 2016.

4. Drew Keeling, “Repeat Migration between Europe and the United States, 1874–1914,” in Laura Cruz and Joel Mokyr, *The Birth of Modern Europe: Culture and Economy, 1400–1800. Essays in Honour of Jan des Vries* (Leiden, 2010): 167, footnote 29.

5. Raymond L. Cohn, "Transatlantic U.S. Passenger Travel at the Dawn of the Steamship Era," *International Journal of Maritime History* 4, no. 1 (June 1992): 57–59.

6. In the late 1870s and 1880s, the press routinely listed first cabin passengers embarking for Europe, highlighting particularly prominent individuals. There are few characterizations of travelers as a whole. This is also the case with much of the secondary literature on nineteenth century American travel to Europe also consists mainly of studies of identifiable individuals. See Maureen E. Montgomery, *"Gilded Prostitution" Status, Money and Transatlantic Marriages, 1877–1914* (London, 1989) and Richard W. Davis, "We Are All Americans Now! Anglo–American Marriages in the Later Nineteenth Century," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 135 (June 1991):140–199 on Anglo-American elite intermarriages and family networks; Margaret H. McFadden, *Golden Cables of Sympathy: The Transatlantic Sources of Nineteenth-Century Feminism* (Lexington, 1999) on women's networking in multiple areas. Numerous works cover the development of the tourist industry; see Nicola J. Watson, *Literary Tourism and Nineteenth Century Culture* (Hampshire UK, 2008) and Jeffery Alan Melton, *Mark Twain, Travel Books, and Tourism* (Tuscaloosa, 2002). Cecilia Morgan's, *"A Happy Holiday" English Canadians and Transatlantic Tourism, 1870–1930* (Toronto, 2008) stands out, however, in using diaries and letters to profile the character and experiences of ordinary tourists.

7. The Act can be found at <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/slavery/images/patuxent-act.pdf>, accessed July 12, 2016. There was no similar requirement for lists of departing passengers and British records for incoming passengers do not cover most of the period under study.

8. A sample form can be found at <http://www.archives.gov/research/genealogy/charts-forms/1882-1903-immigration.pdf>, accessed July 12, 2016. The change in wording in 1882 throws into relief the ambiguity of the previous phrasing "the country to which they belong." I follow Cohen in identifying this with citizenship. Port of embarkation now also became required information.

9. See Michael Tepper, *American Passenger Arrival Records. A Guide to the Records of Immigrants Arriving at American Ports by Sail and Steam* (Baltimore, 1993), for a detailed description of lists available. See the US National Archives and Records Administration and Ancestry websites for details on accessibility.

10. Digitalization efforts have been directed at building up indexes of passenger names rather than full passenger lists. This reflects that genealogists have been the main users of the passenger lists.

11. Raymond L. Cohn, "Transatlantic U.S. Passenger Travel at the Dawn of the Steamship Era," *International Journal of Maritime History* 4, 1 (June 1992).

12. Both Quarterly and Annual Reports from the mid-1870s are available online from the Hathi Trust Digital Library. <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008929735>, accessed July 12, 2016. Table 33 (704) in the 1886 Annual report, for example, is entitled "Statement, by Custom District showing Number of Passengers arrived in the United States" distinguished among "Citizens of the United States returning from abroad," "Aliens not intending to remain in the United States," and "Immigrants," the latter category in this table obtained by subtracting the other categories from the total arrivals.

13. *Statistical Abstracts of the United States* are available at the Federal Reserve Archive (FRASER) at: <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=66>, accessed to July 12, 2016. The relevant table in the 1890 edition is "No. 153. Numbers of Passengers Arrived in the Principal and All Other Customs Districts of Foreign Countries, Distinguishing United States Citizens Returning, Nonimmigrant Aliens, respectively, During Each Year Ending June 30, from 1870 to 1890, Inclusive."

14. Matthew Simon, "The United States Balance of Payments."

15. See Simon, *Balance*, 667 for the original table. See Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund, Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition*, "Table Dh319-326 Americans traveling overseas and foreign visitors to the United States: 1820–2000." Both the "arrivals" and "ocean-bound tourist" series until 1885 included returnees from Canada and Mexico.

16. Brandon Dupont, Alka Gandhi, and Thomas J Weiss, "The American Invasion of Europe: The Long Term Rise in Overseas Travel 1820–2000," *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 13977* (Cambridge, US, April 2008) appearing in revised form as "The Long Term Rise in Overseas Travel 1820–2000," *Economic History Review*, 65, 1 (2012): 144–67; Brandon Dupont, Alka Gandhi, and Thomas J Weiss, "Fluctuations in Overseas Travel by Americans, 1820 to 2000," *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 13977* (Cambridge, US, April 2009). The papers can be found at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13977> and <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14847>, accessed July 12, 2016, respectively. The first paper references the original Douglas and Simon papers while the second cites the *Historical Statistics* table.

17. See Simon, *Balance*, 668; Dupont, et al., *American Invasion*, 6–10.

18. John Killick, "An Early Nineteenth-Century Shipping Line: The Cope Line of Philadelphia and Liverpool Packets, 1822–1872," *International Journal of Maritime History*, XII, 1 (June 2000): 61–. See also Raymond L. Cohn, "The Transition from Sail to Steam in Immigration to the United States," *Journal of Economic History* 65, 2 (June 2005): 469–95.

19. In the 1870s and 1880s "second cabin" or "intermediate" passage. In this paper "cabin" is generally synonymous with "first cabin" in this period; noncabin with steerage. It is not clear, however, to which category Simon assigned second cabin and intermediate passengers; in practice these were designations for the upper tier of steerage.

20. Simon disaggregates the "ocean-bound tourist" series for 1873 to 1894 first by destination, separating out Europe, Latin America, and Asia/Australia, and then, for the European-bound, by cabin and noncabin. In neither case, unfortunately, are we provided with details on how this was done. A footnote to Table 14 indicates estimates derived by the author, based on the tables on passenger departures by custom districts for 1873–1894 and by geographic destination for 1888–94 in various monthly, quarterly, and annual publications of the Bureau of Statistics of the US Treasury. Simon states in the text "Through a complex process involving both many assumptions and detailed calculations, it was possible to develop a breakdown of "ocean-bound tourists," classified by destination." Simon, "Balance of Payments," 667. Dupont, et al. (*American Invasion*, 9–14, 41, figure 5a), do not use Simon's figures on destination but indicate the dominance of Europe as the destination of nineteenth century travelers and present the arrivals figures by port of entry. Passenger arrivals lists included cabin/noncabin information for each passenger from 1855, and port of embarkation from 1882 (previously, the form included only the port of departure for the ship).

21. *Arrivals of Alien Passenger and Immigrants in the United States from 1820 to 1892*, prepared by the Treasury Department Bureau of Statistics, 1893, 136—"No. 18 Statement Showing The Number of Cabin and Other Passengers Departed From The Seaports Of The United States For Foreign Countries, ETC., During Each Year Ending June 30, From 1868 to 1893, Inclusive."

22. Harry Jerome, *Migration and Business Cycles* (New York: 1926): 31–32, 45–48, 54–55, 77–8, 103–5.

23. Research by O'Rourke and Williamson has shown a convergence of real wages between the United States and major European economies over the late nineteenth century (Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History*, (Cambridge, Mass.): 14–25. This may be a factor in long-term trends in migration and repeat migration but is not relevant to short term response to job losses in recession.

24. "Returning Immigrants," *New York Times*, May 21, 1876, 9. There are similar reports after the "Panic of 1893." See "Many Leaving The Country," *New York Times*, July 21, 1894, 9. See also "Tide of Travel is to Europe. Within Six Months More Foreigners Have Gone Abroad than Have Come Here," *New York Times*, July 4, 1894, 3.

25. Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840–1973. A History of Shipping and Financial Management* (London, 1875): 64, footnote. The original source is the *Liverpool Journal of Commerce*, October 29, 1875.

26. Keeling, "Repeat Migration," 167, footnote 29. Keeling indicates that his views are informed by examining "dozens of sampled U.S. passenger lists. Across many years and routes," but unfortunately provides no direct references in this article. However, a later article, specific sampled passenger lists are cited re: the incidence of naturalized Americans in steerage—see Drew Keeling, "North Atlantic Shipping Cartels and the Effects of the 1904 Fare War upon Migration between Europe and the United States," *Societe Suisse d'histoire economique et sociale* 26 (2011): 367.

27. Dupont et al. suggest that Keeling's repeat migration "may help explain some of the upsurges in travel, especially after 1880" but do not link this to Simon's series on non-cabin passenger flows. ("The American Invasion of Europe," 8, footnote).

28. Both series in the 1888–1892 cycle show anomalies in terms of the expected pattern of increased departures during contraction; reduced departures with recovery.

29. NBER dates for business cycles are used here. See <http://www.nber.org/cycles.html>, accessed July 12, 2016. For a critical review see Amelie Charles, Olivier Darne, Claude Diebolt, *A Revision of the US Business-Cycles Chronology 1790–1928* (February, 2011), available at <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00570304>.

30. For Dupont et al., working with the undifferentiated passenger counts, the Long Depression is barely visible. The note only a downturn in 1877–78 (see "Fluctuations," 4).

31. J. R. Vernon, "Unemployment Rate in Postbellum American: 1869–1899," *Journal of Macroeconomics* 16, 4 (Fall 1994): 701–14.

32. A further complicating factor is the common provision in the so-called "Barncroft conventions," a series of bilateral treaties entered into by the United States to regularize the rights of naturalized American citizens. A common provision (though not applicable in the United Kingdom) was naturalized citizens who returned and resided for two continuous years in the country of their birth, lost their US citizenship, and took on that of their country of residence. The main implication was eligibility for military service. See Michael Walter, "The Bancroft Conventions: Second-Class Citizenship for Naturalized Americans," *The International Lawyer* 12, 4 (Fall 1978), 826.

33. Jerome, *Migration and Business Cycles*, 45.

34. See O'Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*, 156–58. They also find that immigrants were disproportionately represented in slow-growth industries and did not pursue employment opportunities beyond the eastern seaboard. This likely increased their vulnerability to job loss in recession.

35. "Second Cabin More Popular. Many Persons of Refinement Now Traveling in That Class," *New York Times* August 18, 1907, 13. Second cabin appears to have been the

home of middle class tourist before WW1. In the interwar period they migrated to the new third cabin or tourist third, also designated college cabin. See Ruth Seinfeld, "Student Tours Abroad Develop Huge Traffic. College Cabins Are Expected to Carry 75,000 Passengers This Summer—Travelers to Europe Other Than Collegians Now Patronizing Them," *New York Times* May 15, 1927, 184.

36. Crossings in late summer 1885: *Abyssinia* August 28, *Adriatic* August 29, *Aurania* September 14, *Britannic* September 21, *Celtic* September 14, *City of Berlin* September 4, *City of Chester* September 19, *City of Richmond* August 28, *City of Rome* Sept 18, *Egypt* August 29, *Etruria* August 24, *Etruria* September 21, *Gallia* September. 8, *Germanic* September 5, *Republic* September 11, *Servia* August 31, *Wisconsin* September 9, *Wyoming* September 16 drawn from the US National Archives and Records Administration's series, *Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, 1820–1897*. These crossings include records for 2907 Americans in first cabin, 367 in second cabin or intermediate class, and 825 in steerage.

37. By 1885, many Americans in steerage would have booked passage on continental, and particularly German, lines. While it is likely these travelers had characteristics at least broadly similar to those on British ships, this cannot be confirmed without detailed study of relevant passenger lists.

38. "Second cabin" meant different things both at different times and on different lines. Prior to the Civil War, on British and American liners, it represented a true cabin class with a dedicated saloon. Cunard maintained this up to 1872. At about the same time Anchor Line, an economy service based in Glasgow, introduced an "intermediate" class subsequently also referred to as second cabin. Other British lines emulated this. However German Lines in the 1880s maintained a second cabin designation true to the original. In 1889, White Star introduced a true "second class." Intermediate/second cabin accommodations on British liners were marginally better than in the main steerage areas, and passengers in this class with valid health documents could land with first cabin passengers rather than being sent to the immigrant reception halls. In April 1885, White Star and Inman advertised second cabin/intermediate fares in the *New York Times* at \$35 compared to \$60–100 in First Cabin and \$15 in steerage; North German Lloyd offered second cabin at \$60–70. For firsthand accounts of life in the British version of second cabin, see Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Amateur Emigrant; from the Clyde to Sandy Hook* (New York, 1902); Elizabeth Putnam Heato, *A Sham Immigrant's Voyage* (New York, 1919). See Drew Keeling, "Transatlantic Shipping Cartels and Migration 1880–1914," *Essays in Economic and Business History*, 17, 1999, 202–4 on the economic logic for second class.

39. Matthew Sobek, "Work, Status, and Income. Men in the Occupational Structure since the Late Nineteenth Century," *Social Science History* 20: 2 (summer 1996): 186.

40. Sobek warns "Researchers must resist the temptation to use income scores as if they measured real income rather than indicated the economic status of an occupation as a whole." ("Men in the American Occupational Structure," 178.)

41. "Americans Abroad. Statistics of American Travel Throughout Europe (from Gailignani' Messenger)," *New York Times*, July 24, 1882, 6. It is unclear whether the German farmers are naturalized citizens or only residents.

42. See Simon, "Balance of Payments," 670, table 15, footnote.

43. *Report of the Director of the Mint Upon the Production of the Precious Metals in the United States During the Calendar Year 1889*. (Washington, 1890): 57.

44. "Shipping" *New York Times* June 5, 1885, 7. The advertised fares show the interchangeability of the terms intermediate and second cabin. Anchor Line listed second cabin at \$35.

45. Dupont et al., "Fluctuations," 12.

46. Keeling, "North Atlantic Shipping Cartel."

47. See Drew Keeling, "Transatlantic Shipping Cartels," 198–99; Keeling, "North Atlantic Shipping Cartels," *Appendix 1*. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, 68. Press accounts at the time confirm the pattern. See, for example, "Rivalry between the Transatlantic Companies—Steerage Rates to Europe To Be Reduced," *New York Times* September 18, 1874, 2 in the case of the Long Depression.

48. See Drew Keeling, "North Atlantic Shipping Cartels," 368, 374.

49. George Deltas, Richard Scotte, and Peter Tomczak, "Passenger Shipping Cartels and Their Effect on Trans-Atlantic Migration," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vo. 90, 1 (February, 2008): 119–33.

50. An example is the statement of facts set out in a Supreme Court ruling against a challenge to the head tax. The statement indicates that the custom house officer requested only information on native country for passengers in steerage. See US Supreme Court. *Head Money Cases*, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) Decided December 8, 1884, 4. <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/112/580/case.html>, accessed July 12, 2016.

51. The companies sought to limit the categories of passengers to which it applied, in particular those who could be deemed tourists. There were evidently also efforts to "game" the system to maximize counts of exempt passengers. See "The Head Tax Law," *New York Times*, August 30, 1882, 8 and "How the Head Tax Is Avoided. Improper Manifests Cheating the Emigration Board out of \$20,000," *New York Times*, December 28, 1883, 3.

52. The crossings (ship, arrival date) are: *Aurania* September 14, 1885; *Etruria* August 24, 1885; *Gallia* September 8, 1885 and *Servia* August 31, 1885

53. In *City of Chester* September 19, 1885, the title of the column designated to record duration of stay ("transient, in transit or intending a prolonged sojourn") has been crossed out and replaced with the hand-written title "Visitor, resident or citizen of the US." Country of citizenship seems also to have been used to indicate native country on *White Star's Britannic* September 21, 1885. The duration of stay column again includes 14 entries of "citizen." These are not, however, recognized in a summary provided of steerage passengers by citizenship. This suggests that the compiler understood that only native country was to be recorded for steerage. I have excluded the anomalous case of an August 29, 1885 crossing of *Adriatic*. Here the steerage list apparently shows only two naturalized citizens out of 162. The two cases, in fact, look to be copying errors in the far right column where citizenship is indicated.

54. The crossings (ship, arrival date) are: *Belgenland* September 21, 1885; *Ryndland* August 27, 1885; and *Westerland* September 18, 1885. Lists for *Ryndland* and *Westerland* show completed columns for country of citizenship and native country. In the case of *Belgenland*, on the native country column is used for steerage but US citizenship is indicated elsewhere. There were two other crossings where the approved form was used, no serious attempt seems to have been made to distinguish current citizenship from country of birth. In *Noordland* (September 2, 1885), entries in the citizenship and native country columns are identical for all 595 steerage passengers, including 101 Americans. In *Waesland* (September 18, 1885) only the native country column is used for steerage passengers with country of citizenship left blank, again indicating a misunderstanding of what information was required.



55. Cohn found that almost 10 percent of his sample of Americans in sail were traveling in family groups that included non-American relations. Unfortunately records that did not allow him to reliably separate steerage from cabin passengers. Cohn, "Transatlantic U.S. Passenger Travel," 46, 59.
56. "Duncan, Sherman & Co. No Arrangements Made To Redeem Their Letters of Credit—A Massachusetts Lady Compelled To Take A Steerage Passage Home—Feeling Against the Firm," *New York Times*, August 6, 1875, 1; "Tourists in the Steerage. Many Americans Have to Return That Way—Object to Vaccination," *New York Times* September 3, 1900, 7.
57. "Home from Europe by Steerage, Broke. At Least a Thousand Holiday-Making Americans Returned That Way in August. Most from British Ports. Improved Steerage Conditions May Have Something to Do with It—Not Hard Times Sign," *New York Times*, September 2, 1910, 3.
58. For an account of improving steerage accommodation see Drew Keeling, "Oceanic Travel Conditions and American Immigration, 1890–1914," June 26, 2013, MPRA\_paper\_47850.pdf, available at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47850/>.
59. See review "Tramping in Europe" *New York Times* March 7, 1887, 3; Thomas W. Knox, *How to Travel* (New York, 1883): 193–200; "How to Be Happy If Poor. Cheap Living in London and Where to Get It. Lodging in Garrets and Dining On Penny-busters—Neither Much Self-Respect Nor Much Lucre Lost," *New York Times* May 30, 1886, 5.
60. "Americans Abroad," *New York Times* April 29, 1866, 4.
61. The A hard fought presidential election in 1876 ended in a close, contested outcome. The result was only determined by negotiation in March 1877. It may be that significant numbers of elite travelers remained at home in the summer and fall of 1876 in consequence of political events. The 1877 passenger figure is for the fiscal year from July 1, 1876 to June 30, 1877.
62. Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic* (London, 1975): 69. An April 1876 article in the *New York Times* saw the stability of cabin traffic as a problem when an increase in such passengers was needed to balance the decline in steerage. "Stagnation in the Tread—The Companies Losing Money—Steamers Withdrawn by Inman and White Star—Emigration Business Unprecedentedly Dull," *New York Times*, April 11, 1876, 10. ("Emigration" here means inbound immigrants.)
63. It is worth noting that under Cohn's scheme virtually all Americans in steerage would have been categorized as tourists. Given his study of Americans in sail involved an undifferentiated sample of cabin and steerage passengers, this is an important factor in the high proportion of tourists he identified.
64. Cohn, "Transatlantic U.S. Passenger Travel," 57–60.
65. Government officials, mainly diplomats, are classed with other professionals and considered nonbusiness travelers. Analysis is restricted to family groups composed entirely of Americans, excluding the few who Cohn would categorize under "family retrieval."
66. See, for example, New York passenger lists for *Fulda*, April 13 1885, and *Werra*, August 29, 1885. On most crossings, however, almost all adult males were labeled tourists, except for servants traveling with cabin passengers and, in some cases, physicians.
67. The specific periods covered are March 28–April 21, 1854, March 26–April 23, 1855, March 20–May 12, 1856, March 22–May 1, 1875, and March 18–May 4, 1885. In 1875, the Inman Line apparently decided to designate all male passengers, sometimes excepting

those with professional standing, as “gentlemen” on the passenger lists. This practice governed all but two crossings in 1875 and 1885. In a few instances other lines followed a similar practice, particularly in 1885 and these lists are also excluded. In the 1854–56 period Americans overwhelmingly chose the American Collins Line over Cunard; they showed no preference for the American owned but British-registered White Star Line over Cunard in later periods.

68. See O'Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*, 114–17.

69. Michael C. Miller, “The Business Trip: Maritime Networks in the Twentieth Century,” *Business History Review* 77, 1 (Spring, 2003): 1–32.

70. Stanley Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain from the Industrial Revolution to World War I* (Cambridge, UK, 1992): 193.

71. Matthew Simon and David E. Novack, “Some Dimensions of the American Commercial Invasion of Europe, 1871–1914: An Introductory Essay,” *Journal of Economic History*, 24, 4 (December, 1964): 591–605.

72. Alfred D. Chandler, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977): 210–15.

73. See “Mills and Gibb, Importer,” *New York Times*, January 1, 1886, 5; Henry E. Ressegule, “Alexander Turney Stewart and the Development of the Department Store, 1823–1876,” *Business History Review* 39, 1 (autumn, 1965): 315–16, 318. Chandler's account in the *The Visible Hand*, of the rise of mass wholesalers similarly stresses organization—in particular the sales force and the buyers.

74. Average tariffs on clothing, housewares, and alcoholic beverages exceeded 50 percent. Donald A Irwin, “Tariff Incidence in America's Gilded Age,” *Journal of Economic History* 67, no. 3 (September, 2007): 585.

75. “A New Road to Ruin. Patronizing Foreign Countries At the Expense of Our Own,” *New York Times* March 30, 1875, 1–2.

76. “Why Do We Export Gold?” *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, May 4, 1895, 771. The disputed average offered by the Treasury Department Bureau of Statistics is \$1000. Simon makes reference to the *Chronicle's* case in his 1955 doctoral thesis (submitted in 1955 but not published until 1978), which contains his first attempt to provide a schedule of tourist costs. Matthew Simon. *Cyclical Fluctuations and the International Capital Movements of the United States 1865–1897* (New York: 1978), 49–55. Both in his thesis and in his 1960 estimates, Simon reduces average expenditures below the \$1000 figure. In the thesis he accepts an estimate of \$1000 for the late 1860s but argues that price declines had reduced costs to about \$650 by the 1890s. In his later estimates, average tourist outlays increase over the period but from a much lower base such that, by the 1890s, even cabin tourists are spending, on average, less than \$600. It is not clear, however, that the 1955 and 1960 figures are comparable since the latter explicitly exclude “sundries.”

77. Charles B. Staphr, *An Essay on The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States* (New York, 1896):128. That we have estimates of income distribution for the early 1890s is due to the legislated return of an income tax in 1894, almost immediately disallowed by the Supreme Court.

78. The source document is the *Annual Report of the Director of the Mint to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1889* (Washington, 1889): 35. The error was compounded in the *Report of the Director of the Mint Upon The Production of Precious Metals In The United States During The Calendar Year 1889* (Washington, 1890): 57, which gave an updated figure of 82,019 Americans departing for Europe in cabin class. The *Annual Report and Statement of the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics on the Foreign*

*Commerce and Navigation, Immigration and Tonnage for the Year Ending June 30, 1890* shows 85,138 as the total number of Europe-bound cabin passengers. No figures are provided for Americans alone; the figure presented in the director of the mint's report required a special tabulation.

79. Business travelers are defined conservatively. Only those identified as merchants, traders or other commercial agents are considered as traveling for business. It is, of course, likely that some of merchants were simply tourists; however, it is also likely that some individuals in other categories, notably professionals, artists, financiers, and manufacturers, were also traveling for occupational reasons. As shown in *table 2*, the proportions of those traveling for business alone, or for a combination of business and nonbusiness reasons, differs between spring and summer crossings. In our calculations, a simple average of spring and summer proportions was used, allowing spring to stand for all nonsummer crossings, accounting for roughly half of passenger volumes. This was also done for family average family size though here seasonal differences are minimal.

80. Dupont et al., "The Long Term Rise in Overseas Travel," 148, *table 1*.

81. "Impoverishing the Nation," *New York Times*, March 30, 1875, 6.

82. "Summering Abroad," *New York Times*, April 29, 1869, 4.

83. "Town Life in Summer. Many Ways of Passing Leisure Hours Comfortably. A Merchant's Philosophical Suggestions—He Saves Money by Sending His Family to Europe," *New York Times*, July 26, 1885, 8.

84. The most consistent increase is in the proportion of passengers in family groups headed by women. This suggests an increase in travel linked to family visits.

85. Twain's contract with the *New York Tribune* provided for the passage money plus \$500 in gold equivalent to \$694 in greenbacks for a total of \$1944 in currency. This calculation is taken from an explanatory footnote in the annotated letter of Clements to SLC to Jane Lampton Clemens and Family, 15 April 1867, in the online archive of the Mark Twain Project. <http://www.marktwainproject.org/xtf/view?docId=letters/UCCL00122.xml;query=travelexpenses;searchAll=;sectionType1=;sectionType2=;sectionType3=;sectionType4=;sectionType5=;style=letter;brand=mtp#1>

86. "Why Do We Export Gold?" 771. The Director's report did not specify items covered, stating a figure of \$10 a day for "all kinds of expenses and purchases." In fact, what was covered in estimates is an issue in comparing figures offered by different sources.

87. Simon, "Balance of Payments," 661.

88. Simon, *Cyclical Fluctuations*, 49–50; "Balance of Payments," 661, 666–71. See *Report of the Special Commissioner of the Revenue* [David A. Wells], *Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting The Report of the Special Commissioner of the Revenue upon the industry, trade, commerce, etc. of the United States for the Year 1869*, xxix (table showing net expenditures of Americans in foreign countries, net of foreign travelers expenditures in the United States) and xxxi, footnote indicating the basis of calculation using average passenger numbers and the \$1000 estimate.] Document available at: <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011550907>, accessed July 12, 2016.

89. "A New Road to Ruin. Patronizing Foreign Countries At the Expense of Our Own," *New York Times*, March 30, 1875, 1–2. A shortened version of the same article was reprinted from the *Buffalo Evening Post*: "Why Our Native Industries are Paralyzed," *New York Times* April 3, 1875, 7.

90. "Letters of Credit. Numbers of European Tourists This Year—The Amount Expended Abroad—Advice to Those Taking Letters of Credit," *New York Times* June 14, 1887, 8.

91. "Americans Abroad. Statistics of American Travel throughout Europe (from *Galignani's Messenger*)," *New York Times*, July 24, 1882, 6.

92. "Next consider the bulk of travel—the general public who have to economize strictly at home and abroad. Of this class a large number of them simply take the voyage, another large lot who make a short stay in Europe perhaps walk, another use a bicycle, others the second or third class cars, and nearly all use lodging houses instead of hotels. Of these travelers it can truly be said if the passage money is not counted the average expenditure would drop to a very small item indeed." ("Why Do We Export Gold?" *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, May 4, 1895, 770–71.)

93. *New York Times* April 15, 1873, 7; Andrew Williamson, *The Golden Age of Travel. The Romantic Years of Tourism in Images from the Thomas Cook Archives* (Peterborough U.K., 1998): 80. The chapter is titled "Innocents Abroad."

94. See Simon, "Balance of Payments," 670, table 15, footnotes.

95. Lee C. Soltow, "Evidence of Income Inequality in the United States 1866–1965," *Journal of Economic History* 29, 2 (June 1969): 281, table 1; Mark Stelzner, "Income Inequality in the United States in the Late 1860s," *Journal of Economic History*, 75, no. 3 (September 2015): 899, appendix table 1. Both studies indicate numerous limitations of the data; however, these do not substantially alter the case made here.

96. Staphr, *Present Distribution of Wealth*, 128. I have selected 1892 as the last year of normal passenger volumes before the precipitous decline following the financial panic of 1893 and subsequent depression.

97. Even Simon's estimates of expenses for noncabin class—\$320 in the early 1870s implying an annual income of \$1280, \$420 in 1892, implying an income of \$1680—are restrictive. Solow would place the 1870s figure in the top three percent of individual incomes in 1869; Staphr would place the 1892 figure within the top 12 percent of family incomes.

98. Daniel L. Boorstein, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in American* (New York, 1962): Ch. 3 From Traveler to Tourist: The Lost Art of Travel. See also "The European Tour" *New York Times* May 2, 1874, 6; "Taking Vacation Abroad" *New York Times* August 10, 1879, 6; and "The American in Europe. Who Should and Should Not Travel" *New York Times* September 4, 1881, 4.

99. For a protectionist view, see "A New Road to Ruin," 1. On the "uncompromising circular" see "Americans At Court," *New York Times* May 29, 1887, 12 and John Arbuckle, "Presentations in London," *New York Times* April 3, 1887, 6; on the pursuit of titles, see "Marrying Titles," *New York Times* March 11, 1877, 6; "Americans for Americans," *New York Times* August 16, 1880, 4 and "Social Hawks. Especially Wealthy Americans on the Lookout for Titles," *New York Times* August 27, 1883, 2 (reprinted from the *London World*).

100. Maureen E. Montgomery, *Gilded Prostitution* and Richard W. Davis, "We Are All Americans Now!"

101. "An Anglo-American Marriage," *New York Times* July 30, 1878, 4.

102. Numerous examples can easily be found by searching the *New York Times* online archives for "Americans abroad." Reports on access to London clubs illustrate both depth of contact and the tension surrounding the process. See, for example, "International Courtesies" *New York Times* July 22, 1885, 4 and "Amenities of Club Life. How Englishmen and Americans Exchange Cards. An Interchange of Courtesies Which Makes the Club Man at Home on Either Side of the Atlantic," *New York Times* September 12, 1886, 4.

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